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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kenneth Franklin Felder appeals from the judgment and sentences
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of three counts of lewd conduct
with a minor under sixteen.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Felder on three counts of lewd conduct with a minor
under sixteen for acts he committed against his step-daughter, A.K., over the
course of two years, beginning when A.K. was eight or nine years old. (R.,
pp.12-13.) A.K. testiffed at trial that, when Felder tucked her in at night, he
fondled her breasts, rubbed her vagina both underneath and over her clothes,
penetrated her vagina with his fingers, licked her vagina, touched her anus with
his fingers, and made her touch his "private parts" under his clothes. (Tr., p.49,

p.66, L.23, p.71, L.24 - p.75, L.7.)

The abuse began when A.K. was in third

grade and continued into A.K.'s fifth grade year, when A.K. disclosed the abuse
to a school counselor who, in turn, reported it to the police. (Tr., p.48, L.3 - p.53,
L.20, p.56, Ls.9-12, p.58, Ls.22-24, p.62, Ls.4-10, p.66, Ls.20-23, p.67, L.21 p.69, L.21, p.168, L.22-p.174, L.25, p.209, L.15-p.211, L.15.)
When questioned by law enforcement, Felder admitted to having rubbed
A.K.'s vagina "five to ten times over the course of [a] year and a half." (Tr.,
p.219, L.17 - p.220, L.4.) He subsequently wrote numerous letters of apology to
A.K.'s mother, expressing remorse for having betrayed his family's trust and

indicating a need for "help." (Tr., p.118, L.7 - p.119, L.4, p.120, L.12

- p.132,

L.12; State's Exhibits 1-7.) When A.K.'s mother filed for divorce, more than two
months after Felder had been arrested, Felder claimed for the first time that A.K.
had fabricated the allegations. (Tr., p. 124, Ls.9-15, p.129, L.22 - p.130, L.l,
p.132, L.21 - p.133, L.2.) He continued to deny the allegations at trial, testifying
that A.K. did not like him because he was a strict disciplinarian, and that the only
reason he told police he had sexually abused A.K. was because the police were
threatening to take his children away from him. (Tr., p.261, L.22 - p.264, L.12,
p.267, L.6 - p.270, L.17, p.273, L.6
p.281, Ls.14-25, p.289, L.19

- p.275,

L.23, p.276, L.22

- p.280,

L.2,

- p.290, L.l, p.303, Ls.8-18, p.304, L.10 - p.305,

L.6.)
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Felder guilty of ail three counts of
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., pp 91-92.) The district court
entered judgment on the jury's verdict and imposed concurrent unified sentences
of 25 years, with 10 years determinate. (R., pp.97-99.) Felder filed a timely Rule
35 motion for reduction of his sentences, which the district court denied. (R.,
pp. 1 10-18.) Felder timely appeals. (R., pp 101-03.)

ISSUES
Felder states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the State violate Mr. Felder's right to a fair trial,
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I, 5 13 of the Idaho
Constitution, by committing multiple acts of prosecutorial
misconduct during closing arguments?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced
Mr. Felder to twenty five years, with ten years fixed, to be
sewed concurrently, for three counts of lewd conduct?

(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Felder failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct, much less
misconduct that rose to the level of fundamental error and deprived him of
a fair trial?

2.

Has Felder failed to establish that the sentences imposed upon his
convictions for three counts of lewd conduct are excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts?

ARGUMENT
I.
..

Felder Has Failed To Establish That He Is Entitled To Relief With Respect To
His Appellate Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
Felder did not object at trial to the prosecutor's closing argument.

Nevertheless, he contends on appeal that the prosecutor made statements
during her closing argument that amounted to fundamental error and prejudiced
his right to a fair trial.

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.) Felder's arguments are

without merit. Felder has failed to show from the record that the prosecutor's
arguments were erroneous, much less that they rose to the level of fundamental
error and a de~rivedhim of a fair trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly improper

closing arguments by the prosecutor, the alleged "misconduct will serve as a
basis for setting aside a conviction 'only when the conduct is sufficiently
egregious to result in fundamental error."' State v. Severson, 147 ldaho 694,
__, 215 P.3d 414, 436 (2009) (quoting State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948

P.2d 127, 140 (1997)). Even if the alleged misconduct rises to the level of
fundamental error, reversal is not required unless "the prosecutors' comments so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process."

Darden v. Wainwriqht, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

C.

Felder Has Not Shown Error. Fundamental Error. And A Denial Of Due
Process. In the Prosecutor's Closina Arguments
A prosecutor has considerable latitude in closing argument.

Severson, 147 Idaho 694, -,

State v.

215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009); State v. Porter, 130

ldaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 14, 909
P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995). He or she is entitled to argue all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in the record. Severson, 147 ldaho at ,
P.3d at 440;

215

Porter,130 ldaho at 786, 948 P.2d at 141 (citing State v. Garcia,

100 ldaho 108, 110, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979)). Thus, to show error, Felder
bears the appellate burden of showing from the record that the prosecutor's
arguments were not based upon the evidence and other events at trial.
Because he did not object to the prosecutor's arguments at trial, Felder
also bears the burden of establishing that the errors he claims were
fundamental. Severson, 147 ldaho at -,

215 P.3d at 436; State v. Field, 144

ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); Priest,128 ldaho at 13, 909 P.2d at
631. Fundamental error is error that "goes to the foundation of a defendant's
rights or ... to the foundation of the case or takeis] from the defendant a right
which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit
him to waive." Severson, 147 ldaho at ,

215 P.3d at 436 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted, ellipsis and brackets original). To carry his
burden of showing fundamental error, Felder must demonstrate that the
allegedly improper comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any
prejudice arising therefrom could not have been remedied by a timely objection
and a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should be

disregarded. State v. Smith, 117 ldaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923 (1990);

Priest,128 ldaho at 13, 909 P.2d at 631.
Finally, Felder also bears the burden of showing that the errors he
complains of rise to the level of creating an unfair trial: "[Tlhe touchstone of due
process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of
the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
219 (1982). See also State v. Reynolds, 120 ldaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002,
1008 (Ct. App. 1991) (the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the
prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not
interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial"). "[A] criminal conviction is not to
be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for
the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be
determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial."
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, (1985). The court must consider the
probable effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's ability to
judge the evidence fairly."

at 11-12.

Felder argues that the prosecutor, in closing argument, improperly
vouched for the credibility of the victim and, in so doing, also misrepresented
facts in evidence and shifted the burden of proof to the defense. (Appellant's
brief, pp.8-12.) He also argues that the prosecutor used inflammatory tactics to
appeal to the emotions, passions, or prejudices of the jury. (Appellant's brief,
pp.12-13.) Felder has failed to show error because his arguments at best ignore
the applicable legal standards, and at worst distort the prosecutor's statements

by omitting context and asserting egregious meanings to proper argument.
When reviewed both in context and giving the arguments even reasonable
meanings, it is clear that the arguments were not error, much less fundamental
error, and did not deprive Felder of his due process right to a fair trial.
1.

The Prosecutor Did Not Vouch For The Victim, Misrepresent Facts
In Evidence, Or Shift The Burden Of Proof To The Defense

Felder's theory of the defense at trial was that A.K. had fabricated the
allegations against him because she was mad at him for being a strict
disciplinarian and for losing his temper with her a few days before she disclosed
the sexual abuse to her school counselor. (Tr., p.39, Ls.13-24, p.261, L.22 p.264, L.12, p.267, L.6 - p.277, L.16.)

In discussing A.K.'s credibility, the

prosecutor made the following statements during closing argument:
For you to believe that [A.K.] would somehow be able to
make up these allegations and that somehow in doing so, that
the state would be able to wrap itself around the allegations
and just happen to find all of these coincidences would make
you think that [A.K.] is so sophisticated and so smart that she
could fool people who do this every day, that her disclosures
about third grade just happened to coincide with the fact that the
defendant was the sole care provider in the third grade; that when
she is in the fourth grade and she gets called into a counseling
group and she's disconnected and having social problems, that we
would be able to realize that it is still going on. And that in fifth
grade when she finally tells about what has happened here, that we
would learn from the defendant that he so threatened her,
information we had never heard before, ever.
See, [A.K.] couldn't possibly put all of that together. The
only thing she can tell you is that what was happening from year to
year, and it is the outside circumstances that have caught up with
what has happened here, which makes it all so much more credible
for her; credible for you, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that you
should convict him of these crimes, that for [A.K.] in this instance,
she should be seen and heard and believed by you.

(Tr., p.339, L.13 - p.340, L.16 (emphasis added).)
Focusing solely on the emphasized portion of the above argument, Felder
claims on appeal that the prosecutor engaged in impermissible vouching.
Specifically, he contends that "by placing itself in the arguments and implying
that the victim could not fool the State, the prosecutor was vouching for the
believability of A.K."

(Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) Felder's claim of improper

vouching fails, however, because it ignores both the applicable legal standards
and the context in which the argument was made.
It is improper for a prosecutor to express a personal belief or opinion
regarding the credibility of any testimony or evidence presented at trial. State v.

m,130 ldaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v.

Garcia, 100

ldaho 108, 110, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979); State v. Gross, 146 ldaho 15, 18, 189
P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624,
632 (Ct. App. 1995). Prosecutors enjoy a considerable amount of latitude in
closing argument, however, and may fully discuss the evidence and the
inferences to be drawn therefrom. Priest, 128 ldaho at 14, 909 P.2d at 632.
This includes the right to comment on how the evidence presented at trial
reflects, for good or ill, on the credibility of any witness. State v. Lovelass, 133
ldaho 160, 168, 983 P.2d 233,241 (Ct. App. 1999);
P.2d at 632.

m,128 ldaho at 14,909

See also Garcia, 100 ldaho at 110 n.1, 594 P.2d at 148 n.1

(prosecutor may, in argument, express an opinion as to the truth or falsity of
testimony when such opinion is based upon the evidence).

Applying these legal standards to the facts of this case shows the
prosecutor's argument, in context, to be proper. The prosecutor did not, as
Felder contends, argue to the jury that it should believe A.K. because the "people
who do this everyday, including the prosecutor's office," believed her.
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) Nor did the prosecutor argue, implicitly or otherwise, that
"the State would not be able to find all the coincidences if [A.K.] was not
believable." (Id.) On the contrary, in asking the jury to find A.K. credible, the
prosecutor made specific reference to the evidence of outside circumstances
that corroborated A.K.'s testimony' (not the other way around) and argued the
reasonable inference therefrom - i.e., that A.K. could not possibly have been so
sophisticated as to fabricate the allegations of sexual abuse in such a way as to
coincide with other events that were occurring at the time. (Tr., p.339, L.13 p.340, L.16.) Because the prosecutor focused her argument on the evidence

'

A.K. testified at trial that Felder began sexually abusing her when she was in
third grade. (Tr., p.48, L.3 - p.56, L.1.) According to A.K., the abuse always
occurred at night, when Felder tucked her into bed. (Tr., p.48, L.3 - p.49, L.14,
p.56, Ls.9-12, p.64, Ls.8-12, p.66, Ls.20-23.) A.K.'s mother, Angela, testified
that she began working nights when A.K. was in third grade and, as a result,
Felder was the sole caretaker of A.K. and her siblings and was responsible for
overseeing their nightly activities, including putting them to bed. (Tr., p.104, L.12
- p.105, L.18.) Angela also testified that A.K. had always done well in school,
but that she started to have "emotional problems" during her third grade year.
(Tr., p.108, L.24 - p.109, L.5.) A.K. continued to have emotional issues and
seemed somewhat disengaged during her fourth grade year and was referred by
her fourth grade teacher to a support group facilitated by the school counselor.
(Tr., p.109, Ls.6-10, p.162, L.18 - p.163, L.25, p.180, L.25 - p.182, L.10.) The
next year, when A.K. was in fifth grade, the school counselor visited A.K.'s
classroom and gave a presentation on inappropriate touching. (Tr., p.67, L.17 p.68, L.9, p.166, L.7 - p.169, L.9.) After seeing the presentation, A.K. first told a
friend that Felder had touched her inappropriately and then disclosed the sexual
abuse to the school counselor and, ultimately, to the police and CARES. (Tr.,
p.68, L.lO- p.71, L.21, p.169, L.10 - p.171, L.23, p.195, L.16- p.197, L.13.)

that reflected favorably on A.K.'s credibility, and did not express a personal
opinion about the truth or falsity of A.K.'s testimony, the argument was proper.

Garcia, 100 ldaho at 110-1 1, 594 P.2d 148-49; Priest,128 ldaho at 14,909 P.2d
at 632. Felder's attempt to show otherwise by omitting the context in which the
argument was made does not show error, much less fundamental error that
deprived him of a fair trial.
Felder has also failed to show error, fundamental or otherwise, in the
following excerpt from the prosecutor's closing argument:
She tells her friend. Her friend encourages her to tell [the
school counselor]. She goes to CARES. She tells CARES what
happened. And ladies and gentlemen, what is important about all
of this is that each of these persons has come to testify, not her
little friend ..., but all these other people have come. And if she
had said anything inconsistent, [A.K.] had been inconsistent with
[the counselor], with CARES, with what the police understood, you
would have heard about it.
You would have heard about it in cross examination. You
would have heard how he brings out inconsistencies in [A.K.'s]
stories, just as the state did with the defendant and how
inconsistent he has been throughout his entire testimony today with
what he told Detective Zakarian seven and a half months ago. You
see, you would have known if [A.K.] had been inconsistent about
any of it, but you never heard about it at all.
(Tr., p.328, L.14 - p.329, L.8.) Felder claims, in conclusory fashion, that "[tlhis
argument similarly vouches for the victim, implying that the prosecutor knows
A.K, has never been inconsistent." (Appellant's brief, p.10.) Once again, Felder
is incorrect.
The arguments made by the prosecutor in this case are similar to those
made by the prosecutor and deemed proper in Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 909 P.2d

624.

Referring to the credibility of the state's witnesses in that case, the

prosecutor in &t

argued, among other things:

And I guess the question that may be asked is, why should you
believe these witnesses? But for a second I'd like to just turn it
around a little bit. Why should you not believe these witnesses?
Have any of them in this courtroom on cross-examinafion been
shown to be lying about what fhey fold you? Have any of them
been impeached? The answer is no, they haven't been....

priest, 128 Idaho at 14, 909 P.2d at 632 (emphasis and ellipsis original). Like
Felder, Priest argued that the prosecutor's comments "impl[ied] that he was privy
to information corroborating the witnesses' testimony that was unknown to the
jury, [and] that he was personally vouching for the credibility of his witnesses."
Id. The Priest court rejected this argument, however, finding that it was apparent
from the context in which the challenged statements were made "that the
prosecutor was merely analyzing the evidence bearing upon witnesses' credibility
and stating the conclusions which he urged the jury to draw therefrom."

Id.

As in priest, a review of the context in which the prosecutor made the
challenged statements in this case also shows them to be proper argument. The
prosecutor did not imply that she had personal knowledge A.K. had never been
inconsistent. Rather, as in m t , the prosecutor analyzed the evidence bearing
on A.K.'s

credibility, including the absence of any evidence showing

inconsistencies in A.K.'s reports of sexual abuse, and asked the jury to draw
reasonable inferences therefrom. Like Priest, Felder has failed to show from the
record that the prosecutor's comments regarding A.K.'s credibility were based on
anything other than the evidence presented at trial and, as such, has failed to

make even a prima facie showing of impermissible vouching.

Priest, 128 Idaho

at 14, 909 P.2d at 632.
In addition to claiming improper vouching, Felder also contends for the
first time on appeal that, by arguing that the jury would have heard about any
inconsistencies in A.K.'s story, the prosecutor misrepresented facts in evidence.
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.)

To support his position, Felder relies on

Washinaton v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689 (dh Cir. 2000), a child sex abuse case in
which the prosecutor argued to the jury that it had heard from the victim's
mother, the doctor, the social worker, m d the victim herself "and nowhere for the
most part based upon what happened, has if [the child's version of events]
changed." 228 F.3d at 700 (emphasis original). However, because none of the
individuals identified by the prosecutor, nor any other trial witness, had actually
testified to the substance of their conversations with the victim, the Hofbauer
court held that the prosecutor's statement that the victim's story had not changed
constituted a misstatement of the evidence.

Id.at 700-01.

The facts of Hofbauer are easily distinguishable from the facts of this
case. Unlike the prosecutor in Hofbauer who, based on the testimony of the
several witnesses to whom the victim had made disclosures, affirmatively
represented that the victim's story had never changed, the prosecutor in this
case never made such an affirmative representation.

Consistent with the

evidence presented at trial, the prosecutor did note that A.K. had disclosed the
abuse to several people, including her friend, the school counselor, and the staff
at CARES. However, unlike the prosecutor in Hofbauer, the prosecutor in this

case did not affirmatively state that the evidence showed A.K.'s version of events
had not changed over time, nor could she have since, as in Hofbauer, none of
the witnesses testified to the substance of A.K.'s disclosures.

Instead, the

prosecutor accurately pointed out that Felder had not presented any evidence,
either directly or through cross-examination of the state's witnesses, to show any
inconsistencies in A.K.'s disclosures, and she asked the jury to draw the
reasonable inference from the lack of any impeachment evidence that A.K.'s
disclosures must have been consistent over time. Such was proper argument,
see Priest,
--

128 ldaho at 14, 909 P.2d at 632, and did not misrepresent the

evidence presented at trial.
Finally, contrary to Felder's claim on appeal

(seeAppellant's brief, p . l l ) ,

the prosecutor's comments regarding the absence of any evidence that A.K.'s
disclosures were ever inconsistent did not shift the burden of proof to the
defense.

See State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App.

2007) (it is error for a prosecutor in closing argument to misrepresent the law or
the reasonable doubt burden). Although the state undoubtedly bears the burden
of proof at trial, a point made clear by the court in its instructions (Instruction
Nos. A, 4, 15-17) and by the prosecutor herself in closing argument (Tr., p.372,
Ls.1-6), it is not improper for the prosecutor to note the absence of evidence on
a particular point. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965); State v.
Hodqes, 105 ldaho 588, 591-92, 671 P.2d 1051, 1054-55 (1983); State v.
McMurry, 143 ldaho 312, 143 P.3d 400, 402 (Ct. App. 2006). This is particularly

true where, as here, the defendant elects to testify and present evidence on his
own behalf. (&,

generally, Tr., pp.256-309.)

Felder testified that he never touched A.K. sexually and implied that the
only reason she said he did was because she was mad at him and wanted her
mother and Felder to get a divorce. (Tr., p.261, L.22 - p.264, L.12, p.267, L.6 p.277, L.16, p.279, Ls.13-20, p.289, L.19 - p.290, L.1.) In response to this
general attack on the veracity of A.K.'s allegations, it was perfectly proper for the
prosecutor to highlight the absence of any evidence that A.K.'s disclosures were
inconsistent even though Felder clearly had the ability to highlight any such
inconsistencies through cross-examination had they existed.

This was not

improper burden-shifting; it was a proper comment on the evidence and the fact
that there was no reason to question A.K.'s credibility given the evidence
presented. m t , 128 Idaho at 14, 909 P.2d at 632. Felder has failed to show
error, much less fundamental error and a deprivation of his due process rights.
2.

The Prosecutor Did Not lmproperlv Appeal To The Jurors'
Emotions

At the conclusion of her closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury
to return a verdict of guilty, arguing "that for [A.K.] in this instance, she should be
seen and heard and believed by you. Convict him for what he has done to her."
(Tr., p.340, Ls.14-18.)

Felder did not object to this argument at trial.

Nevertheless, he claims on appeal that the argument was an improper appeal "to
the emotions of the jury and a sense of community justice by asking the jury to
convict the defendant not based on the evidence admitted at trial but to show the

young victim that they believe her and to convict the defendant for the alleged
harm that he has caused her rather than based on the evidence." (Appellant's
brief, pp.12-13.) Felder's claim is without merit. While it is undoubtedly improper
to invite the jury to convict based on emotion or sympathy for the victim,
Q,

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, -,

see,

215 P 3d 414, 439-40 (2009); State

v. Gross, 146 ldaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (Ct. App. 2008), State v. Phillips,
144 ldaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007), a review of the
prosecutor's argument, in context, shows she did not invite the jury to do so in
this case.
Before making the complained of comments, the prosecutor had taken the
jury through the jury instructions, the evidence establishing the elements of the
charged crimes, and the evidence that reflected favorably on A.K.'s credibility

.

and negatively on Felder's credibility. (Tr., p.322, L.17 - p.340, L.12.) After
spending nearly her entire opening argument discussing the elements and the
proof, especially that bearing on the jury's credibility determinations, the
prosecutor ultimately asked the jury to find Felder guilty, not because A.K. was a
sympathetic victim, but because the evidence showed beyond a reasonable
doubt that Felder committed three counts of lewd conduct against A.K., just as
A.K. had alleged. (See Tr., p.340, Ls.10-14 ("[lit is the outside circumstances
that have caught up with what has happened here, which makes it all so much
more credible for her; credible for you, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that you
should convict him of these crimes . . . .").) Given this context it is clear that the
prosecutor's reference to A.K 's believability was not an inflammatory appeal for

the jury to render its decision on anything other than the evidence presented at
trial. Felder has again failed to show error, much less fundamental error that
deprived him of a fair trial.

See State v. Adams,

147 Idaho 857, -,

216 P.3d

146, 152-53 (Ct. App. 2009) (prosecutor's request for justice for victims not
inflammatory appeal to convict on anything other than evidence and, therefore,
not fundamental error, where remarks came immediately after description of how
the trial evidence proved Adams' guilt).
/I.
Felder Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencins Court's Discretion

A.

Introduction
Felder argues that the concurrent unified sentences of 25 years, with ten

10 years fixed, imposed upon his convictions for three counts of lewd conduct
with a minor are unduly harsh and excessive. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-16.) The
record, however, clearly supports the sentences imposed; Felder has failed to
establish an abuse of the sentencing court's discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a district court's sentencing determination, the question

before this Court is not what sentence it would have imposed, but rather,
whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 ldaho 139,
148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 568,
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)). The length of a sentence is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard considering the defendant's entire sentence.
State v. Oliver, 144 ldaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v.

Strand, 137 ldaho 457, 460,

50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144

ldaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the
sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.

(citing State

v. Trevino, 132 ldaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
C.

Felder Has Failed To Establish That His Sentence Is Excessive Under
Any Reasonable View Of The Facts
Felder was convicted, after a two-day jury trial, of three counts of lewd

conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., pp.91-92.) The victim, Felder's stepdaughter, was just eight'or nine years old when Felder began entering her room
at night and rubbing her breasts, fondling and licking her vagina, touching her
anus with his fingers, and making her touch his penis, all for the purpose of
gratifying his own sexual desires. (R., pp.12-13; Tr., p.49, L.8 - p.52, L.25, p.54,
L.23

- p.56,

L.12, p.58, L.19 - p.61, L.14, p.62, L.4 - p.66, L.23, p.71, L.24 -

p.75, L.7.) Despite the fact that the jury found Felder guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of sexually abusing his step-daughter over a period of two years, and
despite the fact that he admitted as much when initially questioned by the police,
he has since never accepted responsibility nor expressed any remorse for his
actions. (Tr., p.368, Ls.3-6; PSI, pp.2-3, 13; Psychosexual Eval., pp.5-6, 16.)
Felder's character, together with the seriousness of the offense and his
demonstrated unwillingness andlor inability to be rehabilitated, ail support the
reasonableness of the sentence imposed.
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 ldaho

576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 ldaho 831, 11
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.

Baker, 136 ldaho at 577,

38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to
achieve the primary objective of protecting society, or any of the related
sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

Id.

In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court specifically
considered the objectives of sentencing (Tr., p.375, L.22 - p 376, L.lO), the
presentence report (Tr., p.376, Ls.1-3), and the psychosexual evaluation, in
which the evaluator opined that Felder is not a good candidate for sexual
offender treatment and poses a moderate to high risk to sexually reoffend (Tr.,
p.376, Ls.3-4; Psychosexual Eval., pp.1, 14, 16-17). The court reviewed nature
of the crime, including "the fact that it was a repeated offense" and involved "a
very young innocent victim." (Tr., p.376, L.23

- p.377, t.1.)

Based upon all of

the information before it, including Felder's demonstrated unwillingness or
inability to accept responsibility for his actions, the court ultimately concluded
that the imposition of a 25-year sentence, with a ten-year fixed term, was
necessary to protect society. (Tr., p.376, Ls.8-14.)
On appeal, Felder does not even address the nature of the offense or
whether the sentence imposed was necessary to achieve the objectives of
sentencing. Instead, he claims that "the district court should have adequately
considered the mitigating circumstances in his case, including the fact that this
was his first felony, his positive employment history and the support he received

from family and friends." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) This argument fails for two
independent reasons.
First, all of the information Felder claims the district court should have
considered was included in the PSI and was before the court at the time of
sentencing. (&

PSI, pp.3-6 (setting forth Felder's criminal history and noting

people who submitted letters of support), pp.10-11 (employment history); 13
letters of support, attached to PSI.)

The court obviously considered this

information, as it specifically advised Felder that it had "taken into account the
fact that [Felder was] not a career criminal" and had "been a productive member
of society." (Tr., p.377, Ls. 13-17.) Because Felder has not shown that the
court did not consider the factors he claims are mitigating there is no basis for his
claim that the district court abused its sentencing d~scretion.
Second, while the factors Felder claims are mitigating may have some
relevancy to sentencing, a sentencing court is not required to assess or balance
all of the sentencing goals in an equal manner. State v. Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184,
186, 857 P.2d 663, 665 (Ct. App. 1993). As the district court in this case pointed
out, Felder repeatedly victimized his step-daughter over a period of years but
adamantly refused to accept responsibility for his actions. (Tr., p.376, L.4 p.377, L.12.) The district court considered Felder a threat to public safety and
determined that the sentence imposed was necessary to protect the community.
(Tr., p.376, L.8 - p.377, L.19.) That the court did not elevate the mitigating
factors Felder cites above the need to protect society does not establish an

abuse of discretion. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Felder has failed to
establish that his sentence is excessive.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this court affirm Felder's convictions
and sentences.
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